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DIGEST OF CHURCH LAW DECISIONS OF 19401
This digest is the second annual digest of decisions involv-
ing civil church law to be published by the Bureau of Re-
search in Educational and Civil Church Law. It includes
every pertinent case appearing in the seventy reporters 2 of
the National Reporter System which were published in whole
or in part during the calendar year of 1940. Only cases con-
taining problems peculiar to churches are included, and those
cases which involve churches solely as litigants are not
necessarily included. The author's urge to critically evaluate
the included cases has been suppressed as not being within
the purpose of the digest.'
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A. Mandatory Flag Salute as Impairing Religious Liberty.
The right to worship God according to his own conscience
has been considered by many courts during the last year.
This right, considered so sacred by Americans, probably re-
ceived its most delimiting interpretation in the case of
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,4 which held that chil-
dren attending a public school could be compelled to salute
the flag, as a part of the school's patriotic exercises, or be
denied admittance to the school when they failed to do so
on the grounds that such a salute constituted the worship of
a graven image prohibited by the sincere religious belief of
the children. This case settled the controversy as to the con-
stitutionality of such requirements imposed by school boards,
1 Included in this digest are all the church law cases found in the following
Reporters (all inclusive): Atlantic 2d Vols. 10-16; Federal 2d 108-114; Federal
Supplement 30-34; New York Supplement 2d 16-22; Northeastern 2d 25-29;
Northwestern 289-294; Pacific 2d 96-106; Southeastern 2d 5-10; Southern 193-197;
Southwestern 2d 134-143; and Supreme Court Reporter 60.
2 Ibid.
3 For a criticism of the Flag Salute decision of Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, see the author's article, Kearney, Supreme Court Abdicates as Nation's
School Board, 38 Cath. Educational Rev. 457 (1940).
4 310 U. S. 586, 60 S. 6t. 1010 (1940).
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and the opinion itself seems to indicate that the Supreme
Court will no longer serve as the arbitrator of the legality of
acts of local school boards, since among other things Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said: "But the court-room is not the
arena for debating issues of educational policy." '
B. Ordinances and Statutes Restricting Solicitation
of Funds.
Several courts have had occasion to pass upon the legality
of municipal ordinances or state statutes regulating the solic-
itation of funds for religious or charitable purposes. The
Supreme Court considered the problem in two separate de-
cisions,6 in each case holding the regulations invalid as vio-
lative of the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech,
of the press, and of religious worship. In one of the two cases,
that of Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, the Court not only
invalidated the statute requiring approval of the secretary
of the Public Welfare Council before such solicitation of
funds and dissemination of religious beliefs, but it also said
that the regulation was improper even though the activity of
the defendant solicitor was likely to result in a breach of the
peace.
A Federal District court ' sitting in New Hampshire felt
compelled to hold invalid an ordinance of the City of Man-
chester which prohibited the sale of pamphlets or magazines
on the city streets without first obtaining a badge from the
superintendent of schools, on the grounds the ordinance in
question closely paralleled one held unconstitutional by the
5 See article referred to supra note 3. See also the somewhat inconsistent
statement of Mr. Justice Black in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 241, 60 S.
Ct. 472, 479 (1940), wherein be said "Under our constitutional system courts
stand against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might other-
wise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement."
6 Schneider v. New Jersey, and three other cases, 308 U. S. 147, 60 S. Ct.
146 (1939), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940).
7 Leiby v. City of Manchester, 33 F. Supp. 842 (1940).
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United States Supreme Court " as violative of the constitu-
tional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the press. The
court in New Hampshire, however, specifically held that such
ordinance was not violative of the religious freedom claimed
by the complainants who were members of the sect called
Jehovah's Witnesses.
In Ex Parte Williams,9 however, the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the City of St. Louis could rightfully pro-
hibit the solicitation of funds for charitable purposes unless
the solicitor obtained a permit from the charity solicitations
commission. The Supreme Court of Washington in two cases
upheld the right of municipalities to regulate religious and
charitable solicitations, but it invalidated the particular or-
dinance involved on the ground that it was unequal in its
operation since it exempted from its provisions the Seattle
Community Fund."0
C. Statute Requiring License to Parade.
Closely aligned with the validity of regulations imposed
upon the solicitation of funds was the question before the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire when it decided " that an
"Information March" by a number of members of the sect
called Jehovah's Witnesses was a "parade" within the stat-
ute requiring a license for such demonstrations, and that
such statutory regulation was a proper and valid restriction
placed upon the use of the highways.
In an analogous case involving a breach of the peace upon
a public street a New York court refused to dismiss disorder-
ly conduct charges against a political candidate who in a
public address clearly imputed disloyalty and lack of patriot-
ism to the Jews and made an odious and humiliating com-
8 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938);
The Cantwell Case, supra note 6, is also an authority for this.
9 139 S. W. 2d 485 (Mo., 1940).
10 City of Seattle v. Rogers, 106 P. 2d 598 (Wash., 1940); Same v. Bartlett,
106 P. 2d 601 (Wash., 1940).
11 State v. Cox, 16 A. 2d 508 (N. H., 1940).
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parison as against the Jews solely on the basis of their re-
ligion, which statements resulted in breaches of the peace
and disturbances of public order."2
D. Practice of Religion Constituting Nuisance.
While affirming the right to the free exercise of religious
worship the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld a reso-
lution of a city council declaring a church attended by
negroes to be a public nuisance. Among other things the
evidence showed that the communicants of the particular
"House of Prayer" during the course of their religious meet-
ings gave forth weird and unearthly outcries; that there
was loud shouting, clapping of hands in unison, and stamp-
ing of feet; that the incessant use of drums, timbrels, trom-
bones, horns, scrubbing boards and wash tubs added to the
general clamor; and that the disturbance went on far into
the night much to the distress of the inhabitants of the sev-
eral surrounding city blocks. 3
However, members of Jehovah's Witnesses were held not
to have committed a nuisance in a legal sense in going to
homes in a community in order to talk to householders who
would admit the members and listen, especially where it was
shown that the calls were not repeated. 4
E. Right to Hold Spiritualistic Seance.
In the Nebraska case of Dill v. Hamilton,5 "an ordained
spiritualistic medium and minister of the Gospel," sought
a declaratory judgment as to the interpretation of a statute
punishing "any person or persons who shall hereafter take
part in, practice, assist, or become a subject in giving a pub-
lic, open exhibition or seance or show of hypnotism, mesmer-
12 People on Complaint of Neiman v. McWilliams, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 571 (1940).
13 Morison v. Rawlinson, 7 S. E. 2d 635 (S. C., 1940).
14 People v. Northum, 106 P. 2d 433 (Calif. App., 1940).
15 291 N. W. 62 (Neb., 1940). One judge dissented on the ground this action
for a declaratory judgment was in fact an appeal from a criminal conviction of
Dill.
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ism, animal magnestism or so-called psychical forces for
gain." Such statute was held not to prohibit private seances,
or any seance which was not "public and open, and for gain,"
and it was further decided that the fact that the medium re-
ceived fifteen dollars for each seance did not make the seance
"for gain" within the meaning of the statutory prohibition.
LEGISLATIVE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
A. Kosher Meats.16
Three cases involving the sale of kosher meats came be-
fore the courts of NeW York during the past year. Conviction
for sale of meat falsely represented to be Kosher was affirmed
in the case of People v. Leder.17
In another prosecution for improper sale of alleged kosher
meat the court held that where a group of Rabbis had adopt-
ed a plumba as a proper symbol to be attached to Kosher
meat, officers would not be enjoined from enforcing the
statute regulating the sale of such meat on their assump-
tion that fowl not possessing the plumba was a sufficient de-
viation from the accepted practice to warrant the instiga-
tion of a criminal prosecution."8
An interesting case concerning the application of the New
York law relative to the sale of kosher meat arose over the
question whether a person's false statement that non-kosher
meat was sold in plaintiff's kosher market constituted sland-
er. The New York court held that it was and affirmed an
award of fifteen hundred dollars damages for such slander-
ous statement made before several of plaintiff's customers.19
B. Sunday Laws.
Several courts have been asked to pass upon the validity
of acts performed upon Sunday -and other matters relating
16 It is to be noted that People v. Gordon cited in the 1939 digest has
been reversed, see 29 N. E. 2d 717 (1940).
17 258 App. Div. 879, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 291 (1939).
18 Greenwald v. Noyes, 172 Misc. 780, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 707 (1939).
19 Cohen v. Eisenberg, 173 Misc. 1089, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 678 (1940).
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to the observance of the Sabbath. In speaking of Sunday
legislation, Chief Justice Terrell of the Florida Supreme
Court commented in part as follows: "Sunday laws were
among the early attempts to impregnate the law with a
moral flavor. Like other laws actuated by a moral stimuli,
they were born of the concept that man is spirit, and that in
his period of reflection, he'rises above his baser impulses. We
are told that Sunday (not necessarily the first day of the
week) was created for man that he might have one day in
seven to rest from his labors, to reflect on his relation to God,
his obligation to his fellow man, and his duty to his country.
It ill becomes a court to speak of the policy of any legisla-
tion. It is enough to say that Sunday laws have been on the
books for more than three thousand years and have been the
law of this country since Captain John Smith poured cold
water down the sleeves of the cavaliers at Jamestown as a
punishment for swearing." The Chief Justice went on and
concluded that the ninety-year-old Florida statute designed
to prevent unnecessary use of firearms on Sunday had not
been repealed by the General Game and Fresh Water Fish
Act of 1920, since the later act was predicated on an eco-
nomic philosophy whereas the former was predicated upon a
moral philosophy.2"
The Court of Appeals of Georgia held that Sunday is dies
non juridicus and that a service of a copy of a bill of excep-
tions upon a defendant in error upon Sunday was void, and
a writ of error would be dismissed when another such bill
was not served within the required time limit.2
The Supreme Court of North Carolina decided that the
service of an original summons on Sunday was invalid under
the statutes of that state.22
However, the Supreme Court of Montana, to the contrary
has held, that a publication of a summons upon four succes-
20 Harrison v. McLeod, 194 So. 247 (Fla., 1940).
21 Blizzard v. Blizzard, 8 S. E. 2d 679 (1940).
22 Mintz v. Frink, 217 N. C. 101, 6 S. E. 2d 804 (1940).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
sive Sundays was a sufficient publication under statute re-
quiring publication once a week for four successive weeks,
since such publication was not a judicial act." 23
In another similar case a New York court avoided an ar-
bitration proceeding because it was held on Sunday in viola-
tion of a statute prohibiting "judicial proceedings" on that
day. 24
An ordinance of the City of Detroit prohibiting the trans-
action of all real estate business on Sunday was held invalid
by the Supreme Court of Michigan on the ground that the
ordinance conflicted with a state statute which prohibited
the transaction of business upon Sunday excepted from its
provisions persons who conscientiously believed in the ob-
servance of the seventh day of the week as the Sabbath, and
the ordinance was void since it applied to all persons with-
out such exception.2"
Although the illegality of the agreement to pay a real
estate broker his fee was not set up by defendant in an action
to recover the fee the court nevertheless decided that where
the defendant offered the right to sell the property to the
plaintiff broker on Sunday the contract of sale was not con-
cluded on that day, and the contract for the brokerage com-
mission did not arise until plaintiff had procured a proper
purchaser, and there was no evidence that such occurred on
Sunday.26
Where it appeared that although a check was given on
Sunday in pursuance of a contract, the drawer of the check
could not plead its invalidity where it was shown that she
had already accepted the benefits of other parts of the con-
tract.27
23 State ex rel. Fisher v. Dist. Ct. of First Jud. Dist. in and for Lewis and
Clark County, 99 F. 2d 211 (Mont., 1940).
24 Brody v. Owen, 259 App. Div. 720, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 28 (1940).
25 Builders Ass'n v. Detroit, 295 Mich. 272, 294 N. W. 677 (1940).
26 Barry v. Sparks, 27 N. E. 2d 728 (Mass., 1940).
27 Smith v. Hawkins, 102 P. 2d 865 (Okla., 1940).
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TAX EXEMPTION
A. Church Property.
Two decisions concerning the tax exempt status of church
property were rendered during the past year. The first was
a well reasoned and lengthy decision handed down by the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire involving the exemption
of the property of Phillips Exeter Academy, wherein the
court held among other things that the campus, church, in-
firmary, academy building with recitation rooms, library,
administration building, gymnasium and obsolete building
used for storage were "seminary property" and tax exempt.28
The second case decided that vacant property conveyed to
a church for religious purposes exclusively was exempt from'
taxes under statute excluding from tax levy all property held
and used exclusively for religious purposes.29
B. Cemeteries.
Even though religious rites might accompany the burial
of the dead in a cemetery the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that a cemetery corporation was not a
religious society within the scope of unemployment com-
pensation statute.30
Although the cemetery involved was a public rather than
a church affiliated burial ground it is interesting to note
that the Supreme Court of Minnesota in the case of Christ-
gau v. Woodlawn Cemetery Association, Winona,3 decided
that a "public" cemetery should pay unemployment compen-
sation taxes notwithstanding such cemetery was considered
a "charitable" corporation for the purposes of exemption
from general property taxes. It was further held that the
labor performed in greenhouses connected with the cemetery
28 Trustees of Phillips Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 11 A. 2d 569 (N. H., 1940).
29 Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church, 195 So. 607 (Fla., 1940).
so Proprietors of Cemetery of Mt. Auburn v. Fuchs, 25 N. E. 2d 759 (Mass.,
1940).
S1 293 N. W. 619 (Minn., 1940).
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was not "agricultural labor" within another exemption found
in the Minnesota statute.
Under a statute exempting from taxation cemeteries and
"buildings for cemetery use" a chapel on a cemetery grounds
which was also used to house administrative offices and had
a crematory in the basement was held to be exempt from
taxation, by the New Jersey Board of Tax Appeals. 2
TORT LIABILITY OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION
The Young Woman's Christian Association was held to
possess the immunity from suit of a charitable and religious
institution in an action against it for injuries sustained by
the plaintiff when she slipped on the floor of the association's
building wherein plaintiff and others of the public were given
instruction in swimming for a set price. The North Carolina
court in denying recovery from the association preferred to
follow the rule that a religious charitable institution is not
liable in tort to those who receive benefit from it if the in-
stitution has exercised reasonable care in the selection and
retention of the servants causing the injury. The court fur-
ther held that the fact that the defendant association car-
ried liability insurance would not affect its general immunity
from suit. 3
PROTECTION OF CHURCH'S NAME
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
supreme court of that state in revoking a charter granted
a church corporation, incorporated under the name of
"Methodist Episcopal Church, South, Incorporated," so as
to prevent such corporation being confused with the unin-
corporated association known as the Methodist Episcopal
Church South."4
82 Ewing Cemetery Ass'n, Inc. v. Ewing Tp., 18 N. J. Misc. 558, 15 A. 2d
195 (1940).
33 Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940).
34 Methodist Episcopal Church South, Inc. v. Decell, S S. E. 2d 66 (Ga.,
1939). The Supreme Court opinion was commented upon in the 1939 digest.
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Another action involving the Methodist Episcopal Church
South was brought against the South Carolina Conference
of that church for a declaratory judgment for a finding that
there had been a valid union of defendant church with the
Methodist Episcopal Church, and for an injunction restrain-
ing defendant from using the name Methodist Episcopal
Church South or any similar name. However, since the ac-
tion was brought in the Federal District Court of South
Carolina after several suits involving the same subject mat-
ter had been instituted in the courts of that state the Fed-
eral Court declined to take jurisdiction. 5
ACQUISITION OF CHURCH PROPERTY
A. By Will.
Several interesting questions involving the construction
of wills and gifts to religious and charitable beneficiaries
arose in the case of In re Macaulay's Estate. 6 In this case
the New York court first held that a bequest of a part of
testatrix's residuary estate to "the Order of the Sisters of
Mercy of Hartford, Connecticut" was valid although the
recipient was an unincorporated association and not capable
of taking the bequest in New York, but by the law of Con-
necticut the Order was capable of so taking. Another share
of the residuary estate, left to "His Eminence Cardinal
Eugenio Pacelli, of Rome, Italy," for a purpose of his own
choosing was similarly upheld under both the law of New
York and of the Vatican State. Another share was granted
to an incorporated church in trust for the benefit of a day
nursery operated by the church, and this was sustained, as
was a bequest to an unincorporated branch of an incorpo-
rated parent hospital in Albany. Similarly a share was held
to go to "Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart," al-
though not precisely so described by such corporate title in
testatrix's will.
35 Purcell v. Summers, 34 F. Supp. 421 (1940).
36 173 Misc. 887, 19 N.Y. S. 2d 418 (1940).
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently decided that
religious corporations who were beneficiaries of an earlier
will but excluded from a later, pending timely legislative ac-
tion, had such an "interest" in the estate of the testatrix so
as to entitle them to caveat the later will, as against con-
tention that the right of the religious corporations did not
come into existence until sanction of the gift by the legisla-
ture.37
1. Testamentary Trusts.
Where a will left a sum to testator's widow part of which
was to be used in erecting a memorial chapel on grounds
of private cemetery such was considered to create a charita-
ble trust to be made effective except in case of a clear im-
possibility to carry out testator's intent.3 8
In a similar case wherein testator left a fund for the
erection of a memorial chapel on property that was taken
by eminent domain, the court by the application of the cy
pres doctrine authorized the erection of a slightly smaller
chapel on other land. 9
Where the testator left five hundred dollars with the
direction that it be deposited and the interest acquired there-
from was to be spent for the purpose of keeping the
"Yahrzeit" (memorial day) for certain named individuals,
such bequest was held to be a trust for religious uses and
not affected by the rule against perpetuities, or by any al-
leged indefiniteness. 0
A bequest in trust to a named orphanage was held to be
a charitable trust exempt from the operation of the rule
against perpetuities, notwithstanding the orphanage could
if it wished exclude from its benefits all except those of
Presbyterian parentage.41
37 Associated Professors of Loyola College in Baltimore v. Stuart, 16 A. 2d
895 (Md., 1940).
38 Fitzgerald v. East Lawn Cemetery, Inc., 10 A. 2d 683 (Conn., 1940).
39 In re Wilkey's Estate, Appeal of Wilkey, 10 A. 2d 425 (Pa., 1940).
40 In re Steiner's Estate, 172 Misc. 750, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 613 (1939).
41 Powers v. First Nat. Bank of Corsicana, Tex., 137 S. W. 2d 839 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1940).
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2. Conditional Devise.
A testamentary gift of a residuary estate to a church "for
the purpose of building the church, at this time partially
built," and with authority in the executor "to turn over and
deliver to the officers of said church said residue of my
estate, when said church is fully finished and completed and
not before," was held to be a present gift of such residue,
with the right of possession and enjoyment conditionally
postponed, and was not violative of the rule against per-
petuities2
B. By Subscription.
Where many persons, including deceased, executed pledge
cards in campaign to raise money for erection of large build-
ing which would house church auditorium with large hotel
apartment, frustration of the purpose of the parties operated
to terminate liability of deceased under his pledge."
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF CHURCH PROPERTY
A. Power to Mortgage, and Liability Therefor.
Where trustee of an unincorporated religious association
signed a note secured by mortgage, he was held not to be
personally liable on the note where he signed as trustee with
the authority of the association which by law had power to
convey such authority upon him.4
In an action on a note and mortgage executed upon an
archabbey in the United States to secure a loan for the con-
struction of a University in China it was held that the arch-
abbey would be reponsible for the act of its Archabbot not-
withstanding he may not have had authority to so act since
the incorporated society had not repudiated his act. 5
42 Reithmiller v. Carr, 289 N. W. 338 (Nebr., 1939).
43 In re Metz' Estate, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 883 (1940).
44 Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Howe, 113 F. 2d 893 (1940).
45 Benedictine Society v. National City Bank of New York, 109 F. 2d 679
(1940).
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B. Liability on Construction Contracts.
Archbishop was held not liable for amount allegedly due
for construction of church which was built and held for the
benefit of members of the parish in which it was situated,
notwithstanding Archbishop was successor holder of the bare
legal title.46
C. Liability of Church to Judgment and Execution.
Two cases arose concerning this combined problem. The
Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed a judgment against a
church for a mechanics lien, notwithstanding defendant's
contention that since it was an unincorporated society it
was not subject to personal judgment.4" A New York court
also held that the property of a religious corporation could
be sold under an execution to satisfy a judgment agaipst it
notwithstanding the religious corporation law closely re-
stricted the ordinary sale of such property.4"
DisPosAL OF CHURCH PROPERTY
Where local religious group of church members affiliated
for a half century with similar religious groups in general
conference in conformity with rules and ordinances consti-
tuting the ecclesiastical law of that denomination, the right
of dominion, control and disposal of the property of the local
religious group was held to be governed by the church law
which provided that church property no longer usable for
church purposes could be disposed of after decree of its
abandonment by the annual conference permitting its sale
or lease.49
46 Shipp v. Joseph, 12 A. 2d 49 (Pa., 1940).
47 Robins v. East Arkansas Builders Supply Co., 137 S. W. 2d 924 (Ark.,
1940).
48 Rector, Churchwardens, and Vestrymen of Church of the Nativity v.
Fleming, 174 Misc. 473, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 597 (1940).
49 Board of Trustees of Kansas Annual Conference of Church of United
Brethren in Christ v. Mt. Carmel Community Cemetery Ass'n, 103 P. 2d 877
(Kans., 1940).
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BREACH OF CONDITION UPON WHICH PROPERTY ACQUIRED
Where land was conveyed to trustees of a church "to hold
the same as long as the same is used" by the church for meet-
inghouse the Supreme Court of Illinois held that such con-
dition was not broken by the church's execution of an oil
and gas lease covering the land, where it appeared that the
premises were still used for church purposes and the corpo-
ration was still functioning as a church.5"
Where the devise of the property to the church expressed
that it was to be used as a parsonage but contained no
statement concerning whether it was to revert back to the
heirs of the testator in the event that it was no longer so
used, the Ohio court held that. such devise passed the entire
fee to the property which would not revert back upon de-
visee's failure to use the property as a parsonage.51
The effect of a change in the use of property acquired for
religious purposes came before the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas in a case involving the discontinuance of a ceme-
tery owned by a church pursuant to an ordinance of the City
of Houston declaring it a nuisance. The property had been
acquired by Christ Church's corporate predecessor for a val-
uable consideration in fee simple, but the habendum clause
of the deed of acquisition contained the recital that the prop-
erty should be held "in trust forever" to be used "as a ceme-
tery, and for no other purpose." In holding that the church
could dispose of the property the court held among other
things that the phrases quoted did not operate to impose
a condition subsequent upon the property entitling the heirs
of the original seller to retake the property on its discon-
tinuance for burial purposes, and even if it did create a con-
50 Regular Predestinarian Baptist Church of Pleasant Grove v. Parker, 27
N. E. 2d 522 (Ill., 1940).
51 First Presbyterian Church of Salem v. Tarr, 26 N. E. 2d 597 (Ohio App.,
1939).
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dition subsequent the ordinance of the city declaring the
cemetery a nuisance rendered performance of the condition
impossible.2
RIGHT TO CHURCH PROPERTY AS BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS
In an action by several members of an incorporated church
against its pastor, trustees and officers for restoration of the
church and its property to the plaintiffs, such restoration was
ordered where it was shown that plaintiffs' faith was that of
the church before the unauthorized amendment to the con-
stitution and the subsequent changes in the constitution did
not change it back to the original and proper faith of the
church."
In another action similar to the above the Supreme Court
of Illinois ruled that the evidence did not substantiate plain-
tiffs' claim that they composed the faction of the church
which adhered to the tenets and doctrines originally taught
by the congregation. In reaching its decision, however, the
court said it would not consider minor inaccuracies between
the new and the old faith and would look for a substantial
departure from the old tenets before it granted relief. 4
In a third case the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld
the contention of the plaintiff, but after decreeing restoration
of the church property to them, the court refused to go fur-
ther and decree that the defendants were seceders from the
true faith of the original congregation. 5
DEPOSITION OF MINISTER IN FACTIONAL DISPUTE
In a dispute involving the deposition of a minister of an
incorporated Baptist church in New York it was held that
the corporation, as a corporation and not necessarily as a
52 Toole v. Christ Church, Houston, 141 S. W. 2d 720 (Tex. Civ. App., 1940).
53 Kerler v. Evangelical Emanuel's Church of Hales Corners, 292 N. W. 887
(Wis., 1940).
54 Little Grove Church v. Todd, 26 N. E. 2d 485 (Ill., 1940).
55 Calvary Baptist Church of Port Huron, Mich. v. Shay, 290 N. W. 890
(Mich., 1940).
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religious body (which was not passed upon precisely) could
depose the minister and later enjoin him from any attempt
to exercise his functions as such. It was also decided that the
corporate disenfranchisement of members of the corporation
for their misconduct was also proper."
RELIGION IN EDUCATION
In addition to the case of Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, already considered, wherein the Supreme Court
sanctioned a mandatory salute of the flag as required by a
public school board of all pupils irrespective of their religious
belief, several other cases have reached courts of review in-
volving a church and education.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the chil-
dren of school age residing at an orphanage maintained by
the Norwegian Lutheran Church of America were entitled
to attend without cost the public school located in the dis-
trict wherein the orphanage was situated. 7
The legality of the use of public funds to pay the salaries
of teaching Sisters and Brothers, was considered by the
Supreme Court of Indiana in three cases all decided in the
same opinion. From the facts it appeared that the public
school authorities of the City of Vincennes were faced with
the possible closing of all the Catholic parochial schools in
the city which would place an impossible burden upon the
facilities of the public school system. Rather than permit this
the public school authorities agreed to operate the parochial
schools as public schools, and to staff them with- Sisters and
Brothers qualified to teach under State law, and chosen by
the Superintendent of the Vincennes City Schools. The paro-
chial school buildings were used, and religious pictures of
56 Walker Memorial Baptist Church, Inc. v. Saunders, 173 Misc. 455, 17
N. Y. S. 2d 842 (1940). See also the action by Minister Saunders to bring about
his reinstatement, which action was dismissed because of his failure to satisfy
precedent procedural requirements, Saunders v. Armstead, 259 App. Div. 119, 18
N. Y. S. 2d 279 (1940).
57 State ex rel. Johnson v. Cotton, 289 N. W. 71 (S. Dak., 1939).
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Jesus Christ, the Holy Family and secular pictures of George
Washington and other American statesmen were left on the
walls of the class room. The teaching staffs and the schools
themselves were under the control of the Superintendent of
the Vincennes City Schools, and there was no evidence of
religious instruction being given as a regular course. The
court held that they were public schools and the wearing of
sectarian garb by the teachers, and the fact that the salary
paid to the teachers might have been turned over by them
to their religious communities had no effect upon the re-
sult.58
The Supreme Court of Kansas in another case involving
the alleged use of public funds to support a sectarian school
found that under the facts the expenditure by the school
board was illegal and should be enjoined where it was shown
that the school board operated one school which was ade-
quate for the needs of the district, but that, in violation of
constitutional prohibitions against aid to religious institu-
tions, the board had maintained a second school in the home
of a priest and sisters of the Catholic Church, and had per-
mitted such to be under the control of such priest and sis-
ters. The court did not pass upon whether the teaching of
sectarian doctrines in a properly organized public school
might be invalid, but it indicated that such instruction might
be in violation of the Constitution of Kansas.59
Although not directly involving questions of church law
the decision of the New York court revoking the appoint-
ment of Bertrand Russell as a Professor of Philosophy in
the College of the City of New York is interesting because
58 State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, Same v. Viets, Same v. Krack, 28 N. E.
2d 256 (Ind., 1940). This case has been commented upon in 16 NoTRE DAME
LAW'YR. 148, and in Catholic Schools and Public Money, 50 YALE LAW J. 917
(1940).
50 Wright v. School District No. 27 of Woodson County, 151 Kans. 485, 99
P. 2d 737 (1940).
DIGEST OF CHURCH LAW
of its vigorous denunciation of the appointment as creating
a "chair of indecency" and because of Russell's allegedly im-
moral writings and views was an appointment in direct
violation of the public health, safety and morals of the peo-
ple of the state of New York."
lames I. Kearney.
College of Law, University of Notre Dame.
60 Kay v. Board of Higher Education of City of New York, 173 Misc. 943,
18 N. Y. S. 2d 821 (1940). See also the similar case involving the same man at
the University of California, where a writ of prohibition was denied, Wall v.
Board of Regent of University of California, 102 P. 2d 533 (Calif. App., 1940).
